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An axiom of Anglo-American jurisprudence held that whenever
the statutorily permissible punishment varied according to the presence
or absence of an identifiable fact (or "element") found within a statute,
that fact was required to be plead in the indictment and proved by the
required standard of proof, which was usually beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 This long-held notion, given constitutional protection by the
United States Supreme Court in In re Winship,2 was dealt what now
appears to have been a near-fatal blow in the watershed case of
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.3 In McMil!an,4 the United States Supreme
* J.D., Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, 1999.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
1. See infra Section II.
2. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. Dynel McMillan, Lorna Peterson, James J. Dennison, and Harold L. Smalls had their
appeals consolidated for the McMillan decision. In each case, the defendants were convicted of
"visibly possess[ing]" a weapon during the commission of their various crimes. Id. at 82-83. The
defendants in McMillan challenged the mandatory minimum sentences imposed under the
Pennsylvania statute, claiming that Winship prevented the state from imposing any sentence unless
"every fact necessary to constitute the crime" had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 84 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). The Court rejected this challenge and instead relied
on Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214 (1977), for the proposition that, at least in some
instances, even if the state links the severity of punishment to the presence or absence of an
identifiable fact, it does not follow that the state must then require proof of that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84-85. According to the McMillan Court, the
Pennsylvania statute at issue did not (1) alter the maximum penalty; (2) create a separate crime
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Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years for defendants who visibly possessed
a firearm during the commission of a predicate offense.' The statute
specifically provided that such possession "shall not be an element of
the crime," that notice to the defendant of the State's intention to
pursue the mandatory minimum penalty under the statute "shall not
be required prior to conviction" (but was required before sentencing),
and that the facts which would be necessary to sentence the defendant
to the mandatory minimum could be established by a preponderance
of the evidence.6
Proving another axiom of American jurisprudence-that "[n]ot
every epochal case has come in epochal trappings"7-McMillan
prompted an abstruse, yet revolutionary, change in the way that facts
bearing directly on statutorily available punishment are found in
criminal cases. McMillan marked the birth of the "sentencing
factor,"' a concept that radically restructured the roles of judge and
jury by shifting to the court the ability to make at sentencing, and by
a preponderance of the evidence, factual determinations that, prior to
McMillan, had to be made by juries, at trial, and beyond a reasonable
doubt. McMillan not only restructured the traditional roles of judge
and jury; Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion also provided a
bit of canine context for courts to use in determining whether a fact at
issue is an "element" of an offense or a "sentencing factor." The
sentencing factor, according to Rehnquist, was the "tail" of the "dog"
and could be determined by a judge so long as the factor did not
"wag[] the dog of the substantive offense."
Now, some twelve years after the decision, McMillan can be
clearly identified as a major turning point in American criminal law.
The decision is significant for its retreat from virtually uniform
precedent that held that whenever the sovereign sought to punish a
defendant, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
that would allow it to impose a punishment within a specified range.' °
with a separate penalty; (3) unfairly place the burden of proof on the defendant; or (4) remove
the prosecutor's burden of proving guilt. Id. at 87-88.
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(b) (1982).
6. Id.
7. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J. dissenting).
8. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86. The term "sentencing factor" did not come into wide use or
become a term of art in this context until after McMillan. Prior to McMillan, the use of the term
"sentencing factor" was generally limited to those facts that determined punishment within the
statutory range under the indeterminate sentencing regime. See infra note 45.
9. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
10. See discussion infra Section II.
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These facts, which both defined the crime and helped to gradate levels
of punishment, were called "elements" of the crime."
The reach of McMillan was recently broadened by the Court in
Almendarez- Torres v. United States,2 in which the court appeared to
hold that even if a sentencing factor dramatically increases the
statutorily available punishment, it may still be decided by the judge
rather than the jury.' However, the Court's holding in Almendarez-
Torres was cast into doubt less than two weeks later when the Court
granted certiorari in Jones v. United States.'4 Certiorari was granted
in order to decide whether the gradated punishment scheme found in
the federal anticarjacking statute 5 requires that certain factual
findings, such as whether the crime resulted in "serious bodily injury,"
should be classified as elements of the statute or merely sentencing
11. Courts did not always use the term "element" in describing certain facts found within
statutes. But the point was clear, as will be suggested later, that even if the fact is not designated
an "element," its bearing on the defendant's sentence would still require-and was seen by earlier
courts as clearly requiring-jury determinations beyond a reasonable doubt. See discussion infra
Section II.
Broken down to basic formulations, four types of "elements" are present in most statutes.
First, each statute may contain some kind of jurisdictional elements, which set jurisdiction and
venue but are rarely explicit within the statute itself. Second, most statutes also contain what may
be termed physical elements. These include the where, when, and what of most offenses. Third,
statutes may contain a mental culpability level. In the context of this article, the most common
mens tea element is "scienter"-knowledge of a particular fact. Other mens tea elements include
purpose, recklessness, and criminal negligence with regard to an element of the offense. Prior to
the Model Penal Code, state statutes and common law crimes used a bewildering array of mens
tea terms to denote culpability. A defendant's mens tea will in most cases play a critical role in
determining what the defendant will be charged with as well as his or her available defenses. The
major exception to the mens rea requirement would be those crimes which are malum prohibitum,
or strict-liability offenses wherein no mens rea is required. See, e.g., Richard G. Singer, The
Resurgence of Mens Rea: Ill-The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337
(1989); Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (dictum). Fourth, some statutes contain
penal elements. These are facts which, if found by the jury, allow for the imposition of a certain
punishment that could not otherwise be imposed. Many times these elements are called
aggravating factors. For example, if the punishment shifts from one level to another based upon
the amount or quantity involved, then that amount or quantity would be considered a penal
element. This article will focus primarily on these penal elements of crimes.
12. 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).
13. Id. at 1231. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held that the determination of whether
the defendant was a recidivist under subsection (b)(2) of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (which increases the
available punishment for an alien deported due to a conviction for an aggravated felony, and who
then returns to the United States, from two years maximum to twenty years maximum) may be
made by the sentencing court. See infra note 214, and accompanying text.
14. United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd mem., 116 F.3d 1487 (1997),
cert. granted sub nom., Jones v. Unites States, 118 S. Ct. 1405 (1998).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997). This section is set out in full infra note 248
and accompanying text.
Seattle University Law Review
factors.16 With Jones, the Court has an opportunity both to clarify
the reach of-if not overruleH-McMilan and to finally set some clear
limits on exactly how far the state may go in taking away from the jury
those issues which bear directly on punishment.
McMillan's impact on determining what constitutes a crime has
been profound. Today, in contrast to pre-McMillan procedure, trial
courts, rather than juries, routinely make factual determinations, such
as the amounts involved in a drug crime,' 7 despite the fact that these
factual determinations directly and seriously impact the amount of time
a convicted person will spend in prison." Indeed, following McMil-
lan, courts have embraced the idea that so long as a particular fact is
deemed relevant only at sentencing, it may be proved to a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence with diminished due process protections
and without the protections of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 9
The essential problem Chief Justice Rehnquist's canine metaphor
in McMillan presents is that it fails to guide the lower courts in their
decisions concerning the following questions: (1) what constitutes an
element of the offense?; (2) what distinguishes elements from sentenc-
ing factors?; and (3) when does the sentencing factor "tail" actually
wag the dog? While prior to McMillan it seemed clear that every fact
which authorized a certain punishment within a gradated punishment
scheme2" was an element of the offense, today it is not altogether clear
which facts are elements as opposed to sentencing factors. Trial courts
are now forced to rely upon a post-McMillan framework which looks
more to the legislative designation of the particular fact than to whether
the fact at issue bears a direct relationship to available punishment.
This article will argue that McMillan makes the trial courts' confusion
16. The Court addressed this issue head on in Jones, as noted in the order granting
certiorari, which limited the questions before the Court to:
a. Does 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)-(3) describe sentencing factors or elements of the offense?
b. If 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)-(3) sets forth sentencing factors, is the statute constitutional?
Jones, 118 S.Ct. at 1405. The Court, relying on the notion of constitutional doubt (see Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trade Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)), answered
the first question only. See infra addendum.
17. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 163-67 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion of United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596 (3rd Cir. 1987) infra note 184
and accompanying text. See also Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated
Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289 (1992); Benjamin Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional
Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON H. L. REV. 459 (1993).
20. The clearest example of a gradated punishment scheme is when a crime is transformed
from a misdemeanor to a felony (and with that transformation the permissible range of
punishment changes) based upon a specific factual finding.
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unavoidable, and that the best solution is to reject the trend fostered
by McMillan and return to the traditional jury-focused approach. If
federalism concerns make adopting this approach too difficult, the
Court should use Jones to adopt it not as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, but rather as a matter of statutory interpretation
applicable solely to the federal criminal code. Since there are in fact no
contradictory cases (except Almendarez- Torres), and since none of the
pre-McMillan cases spoke of sentencing factors, that path may be
easier to follow.2'
21. During the oral argument in Jones v. United States, reported in 64 CRIM. L. REP., 2043
(Oct. 21, 1998), both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer indicated their concern that
holding that any statutorily enunciated fact was an element of the crime would cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 2044. Their concerns are not,
at first blush, unwarranted. The Guidelines, after all, specify numerous "facts" upon which
sentences may be increased; indeed, they are a telephone-book length compendium of such facts.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1994). The prospect that a jury would be confronted with
all such facts at trial (or even during a postconviction proceeding), and would have to resolve
them beyond a reasonable doubt, is daunting.
One could distinguish the Guidelines from the statutes discussed in this article solely on the
basis that Congress has specifically embraced, as relevant to the sentence for a particularized
crime, the "factors" involved, whereas the "factors" in the Guidelines have never been formally
adopted by Congress. Thus, while one set of "factors" (those found within statutes) have gone
through Congress' deliberative process of lawmaking, another set of "factors" (those found within
the Guidelines) merely have Congress' indirect imprimatur. The Sentencing Commission Act
provides that the Commission may, once a year, propose changes in the Guidelines. These
proposed changes become effective if Congress does not act to prevent their effectiveness within
180 days after the submission. See 28 U.S.C. § 9 9 4 (p) (1984). Thus, the Guidelines are not even
so much "adopted" by Congress as "not rejected." In a sense, the Guidelines are two steps
removed from a statutorily enacted factor, where Congress actively embraces not an administrative
recommendation, but a bill actually submitted as most other legislation is submitted. In the midst
of a Congress otherwise involved in matters of impeachment, foreign policy, or election
campaigns, it is hard to argue that the proposed changes receive the same attention as a bill
actually enacted into law. Inertia in the latter case means no law; in the former, it means that the
proposals become law. This distinction between the Guidelines and statutes is, we submit,
sufficient to warrant different treatment, even if both the statute and the Guidelines are "binding"
upon district courts once the Guidelines go into force. Simply put, Congress has not, neither as
a factual nor theoretical matter, considered the factors involved in the Guidelines with as much
precision as it has weighed the impact of factors that are expressly enunciated in a statute.
Additionally, although it is true that the Guidelines increase specific sentences on the basis
of specific facts, there is no single fact under the Guidelines that results in an increase, however
measured, as severe as the increases required by the majority of "factors" under consideration
here. While the Supreme Court has not tested -the Guidelines under the "proportionality"
standards required by the Eighth Amendment, (see, e.g., Harmlin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991)), perhaps the Court may be forced to revisit the outlines of the doctrine as applied to these
newly enunciated "sentencing factors" which, on their own, dramatically increase a defendant's
sentence.
The primary argument for adhering to the pre-McMillan caselaw is essentially that any
statutorily enacted factual issue that can increase the sentence above the otherwise available
maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. While there is concern that such
a rule may endanger the Guidelines, the distinction between a legislatively-allowed and a
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Part II of this Article will examine the historical importance of
punishment as a litmus test in the common law in finding the elements
of an offense. In Part III, the historical approach used by federal
courts when value or quantity was at issue will be analyzed in order to
round out the pre-McMillan framework. Part IV will discuss the
McMillan decision, as well as the post-McMillan regime. Part V will
analyze Jones v. United States,22 the case now pending before the
Court, in which the Court may have its last chance to correct the error
of McMillan and clarify exactly what facts need to be proved to a jury
in the twenty-first century and why.
II. PUNISHMENT AS A LITMUS TEST IN ELEMENT ANALYSIS
The link between punishment and the elements of an offense was
identified in general terms by Professor Herbert Packer when he wrote:
What we mean by "crime" or an "offense" is simply conduct that
is forbidden by law and to which consequences, called punishment,
will apply on the occurrence of stated conditions and following a
stated process. A crime is not merely any conduct forbidden by
law; it is forbidden conduct for which punishment is prescribed and
which is formally described as a crime by a government agency
having the power to do so. . . . But the definition of crime is
inescapably tautological. Crime is whatever is formally and
authoritatively described as criminal.23
Historically, those formal and authoritative descriptions of crime
were exactly those occurrences, situations, or facts that combined to
make up the offense. Facts which constituted the crime itself were
called "elements of the offense (crime)" and had to be alleged in the
indictment and proved at trial before punishment could be imposed.
In 1895, Joel Prentiss Bishop, perhaps the leading nineteenth century
authority on criminal law, wrote in his treatise on criminal procedure:
[E]very wrongful fact, with each particular modification thereof,
which, in law, is required to be taken into the account in determin-
ing the punishment upon a finding of guilty, must be alleged in the
indictment. . . . This doctrine is fundamental. Originating in
legislatively-enacted factor distinguishes the two doctrinally. It is this doctrinal distinction
between the two types of "factors" which require a distinction in process and protection.
22. 118 S. Ct. 1405 (1998).
23. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 18 (1968) (emphasis
added).
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natural reason and abstract justice, it has been adopted into the
common law and confirmed by our written constitutions. 4
Bishop was not alone in finding that these "elements" included those
essential facts that amounted to the crime and made available certain
punishment. In his early nineteenth century writings on American
jurisprudence, John Milton Goodenow summed up the relationship
between lawmaking and the infliction of punishment this way:
"[M]unicipal law, as a rule of civil conduct, authorising the infliction
of human punishment, must be prescribed by the supreme power, in
an unequivocal style, defining the offence, directing the tribunal which
shall try, and the minister who shall execute. '"25
The general rule that every fact which constitutes an aggravation
of the offense had to be alleged and proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt is reflected in numerous state court opinions26 and
early English cases,27 as well as in early federal cases." Indeed, as
24. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP'S NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 77(1)-(2), at 47
(4th ed. 1895); see also WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., CLARK'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 60, at 181
(2d. ed. 1918) ("The indictment must show ... every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the offense, whether such fact or circumstance is an external event ... or a
circumstance of aggravation affecting the legal character of the offense.").
25. JOHN MILTON GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND
MAXIMS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 45 (Roy M. Mersky, J. Myron Jacobstein, eds., William
S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1972) (1819).
26. See State v. Perley, 30 A. 74, 75 (Me. 1894) (holding that if fact is essential to
punishment, it must be alleged and proved to a jury); Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. (1 Will.)
245, 246-47 (Mass. 1804) (setting aside conviction for larceny where indictment failed to allege
value); State v. Clay, 13 S.W. 827, 830, (Mo. 1890) (holding that any part of the foundation for
punishment must be stated in the indictment and proved); State v. Perry, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail) 17
(1830) (stating that a positive and affirmative averment is needed to know the degree of
culpability); Hobbs v. State, 44 Tex. 353, 354 (1875) (noting where statute imposed 2-5 years if
house was entered without force, but 3-10 years if entry was with force, that force must be alleged
in the indictment); Garcia v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. 389, 393 (1885) (holding indictment must
allege use of a Bowie knife or dagger in order to impose double sentence under statute).
27. See Bradlaugh v. Reg., Law Rep., 3 Q.B.D. 607, 626 (1878) (holding that whatever
circumstances are necessary to constitute the crime imputed must be set out); White v. Reg., 13
Cox. Cr. Cas. 318, 327 (Q.B.D. 1876) (after Chief Judge Whiteside restates this general rule,
Judge Fitzgerald chides the prosecutor by saying, "A practice has recently prevailed of shaping
indictments in so very general a form as to cast the smallest burden of proof on the prosecu-
tor;-that may be all right, but the prosecutor has in the present instance finessed too much.");
Rex v. Home, 98 Eng. Rep. 1300 (1777) (holding that "[t]he charge must contain such a
description of the crime, that the defendant may know what crime it is which he is called upon
to answer; that the jury may appear to be warranted in their conclusion of 'guilty' or 'not guilty'
upon the premises delivered to them; and that the Court may see such a definite crime, that they
may apply the punishment which the law prescribes.") In other words, English law required that
when punishment varied according to the statute, an indictment should at the very least charge
the defendant in the words of the statute.
Lord Hale noted that when an offense may be indictable either at common law or under
statute, both with different penalties, or if the indictment is unclear (or it does not include the
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early as the 17th century, Lord Hale noted in his Historia Placitorum
Coronw,29 "If theft be alleged of any thing, the indictment must set
down the value, that it may appear, whether it be grand or petit
larceny."3  Indeed, in cases where a distinction could be drawn
between manslaughter and murder, Lord Hale noted that unless the
indictment was crafted in such a way as to clearly allege murder, the
"offender shall have his clergy"31 because the indictment failed to
specifically allege the aggravating factor "ex malitia prcecogitata."32
However, when following the statute precisely might have resulted
in unfairness to the defendant, the English courts were ready to act.
In Rex v. Peel,33 the defendant was tried and convicted of stealing a
cow. The indictment omitted the value of the cow. The statutes
34
made stealing any sheep or cattle a felony punishable by a capital
sentence without benefit of clergy, but did not mention value. While
ordinarily merely parroting the words of the statute would have been
sufficient,35 the trial judge was unsure whether he could rightly pass
a capital sentence to the defendant when any allegation of value was
absent from the indictment.36
incantation contraformam statuti), then only the common law penalty can be imposed. See 2 SIR
MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONf 191 (P.R. Glazebrook, ed., Professional
Books Limited 1971) (1736) [hereinafter 2 HALE].
28. United States v. Fisher, 25 F. Cas. 1086 (D. Ohio 1849) (No. 15, 102) (noting that
indictment must allege that item stolen contained an article of value in order to impose higher
penalty); United States v. Corbin, 11 F. 238, 240-41 (C.C.D. N.H. 1882) (restating the general
rule and citing various English authority).
29. 2 HALE, supra note 27, at 183.
30. Id.
31. "Benefit of clergy" originally described a clergyman's exemption from the jurisdiction
of secular courts in certain cases. More commonly it meant an exemption from the punishment
of death. The concept of "benefit of clergy" operated to ameliorate some of the harshness of the
English common law. "Benefit of clergy" was abolished in the United States in 1790. 1 Stat. 119
(1790).
32. 2 HALE, supra note 27, at 186-87 (with malice aforethought).
33. 168 Eng. Rep. 870.
34. 14 Geo. II. ch. 6 (1741) (Eng.); 15 Geo. II., ch. 34 (1742) (Eng.).
35. See 7 Geo. IV. ch. 64, s. 21 (1826) (Eng.), which reads in part:
No judgment after verdict upon any indictment or information for any Felony or
Misdemeanor shall be stayed or reversed for want of a Similiter, . . . and that where the
offence charged has been created by any Statute, or subjected to a greater degree of
punishment, or excluded from the Benefit of Clergy by any Statute, the Indictment or
Information shall after verdict be held sufficient to warrant the punishment prescribed
by the Statute if it describes the offence in the words of the Statute.
36. Peel, 136 Eng. Rep. at 870. The distinction between capital and noncapital larceny led,
of course, to the infamous exercise of "pious perjury" among English juries, who consistently
refused to value items stolen above the misdemeanor amount, lest the defendant hang. This
practice soon resulted in the elimination of capital punishment for many "nonviolent" crimes.
See 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW, 94-97 (1948). A more
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The panel of English judges decided (7-4) that even though the
statute made the stealing of any sheep or cows a felony without clergy,
the statutes ought to nonetheless be construed in the same manner as
statutes that took away clergy only upon proof that the value of the
stolen property was over a certain amount. Therefore, the capital
sentence was unavailable.
3 7
The American adoption of this general rule was best stated in
Hope v. Commonwealth,38 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in 1845. Requiring that an allegation of value must be made
before certain punishments could be inflicted, the Court wrote:
The well settled practice, familiar to us all, has been that of stating
in the indictment the value of the article alleged to have been stolen.
... The reason for requiring this allegation and finding of value
may have been, originally, that a distinction might appear between
the offenses of grand and petit larceny, in reference to the extent of
punishment; that being graduated, in some measure, by the value of
the article stolen. Our statutes, it will be remembered, prescribe the
punishment for larceny with reference to the value of the property
stolen; and for this reason, as well as because it is in conformity
with long established practice, the court are of the opinion that the
value of the property alleged to be stolen must be set forth in the
indictment. . .."
In United States v. Reese,4" the Supreme Court restated this rule and
noted that it was "paramount to all others, and is one of universal
application,-that every ingredient of the offence must be accurately
and clearly expressed; or, in other words, that the indictment must
contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the
punishment to be inflicted."'"
In addition to the cases which required specificity in pleading
larcenies and other crimes, other courts required the state to plead and
prove that a defendant was a recidivist because this status bore on the
pronounced example of juries deciding factors that went to punishment would be difficult to
provide.
37. Peel, 136 Eng. Rep. at 870. The result was not unlike that reached by Judge Friendly
in United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961), discussed infra at Part III: both cases
required that critical issues regarding punishment be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
38. 50 Mass. (1 Met.) 134 (1845).
39. Id. at 136-37 (internal citations omitted).
40. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
41. Id. at 232 (citing United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168, 174 (1872)). The Court also cites
favorably Bishop's comments as stated supra note 24. The Supreme Court addressed the elements
necessary within indictments in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557-59 (1875).
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statutorily available punishment. As William Clark noted in his
treatise on criminal procedure in 1918, "Where an increased punish-
ment is imposed for an offense when it is accompanied by certain
aggravating circumstances-as under statutes imposing a higher penalty
for a second or third offense-the aggravating circumstance must be
alleged in the indictment.14 2 Clark continued, "This rule . . . is true
in all other cases where an act is punished more severely because
accompanied by circumstances of aggravation.
43
English commentators have also recognized this long-standing
principle concerning recidivism. Sir William Oldnall Russell explained
in 1865:
If ... a later statute expressly alters the quality of an offence by
making it a misdemeanor instead of a felony, the offence cannot be
prosecuted under the former statute, and the same consequence
follows from altering the procedure and the punishment.
And where the statute makes a second offence a felony, or
subject to a heavier punishment than the first, it is always implied
that such second offence ought to be committed after a conviction
for the first; from whence it follows, that if it be not so laid in the
indictment, it shall be punished but as the first offence: for the
gentler method shall first be tried, which perhaps may prove
effectual.
4
On the other hand, nineteenth century American common law, as
well as much older English jurisprudence, supports the notion that
facts that went only to sentencing within the applicable statutory range
did not need to be pleaded in the indictment because those facts could
not alter the available minimum or maximum sentence a defendant
faced. These historical "sentencing facts" included, for example, the
defendant's demeanor in the courtroom, as well as any other facts
which the sentencing court might take into account.
42. CLARK, supra note 24, § 84, at 237.
43. Id., § 84, at 239 (internal citations omitted).
44. 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 79 (C.S. Greaves ed., 4th ed. 1865) (internal citations omitted).
This tradition, which was not discussed in Almendarez-Torres, is now highly questionable, if not
completely eviscerated. See discussion infra notes 214-30 and accompanying text.
45. Discussing the role of the court in exercising discretion within the limits established by
law, Bishop noted:
If, as is common in our legislation, and not unknown under the unwritten law, the
punishment is discretionary with the courts, the considerations which aggravate an
offence in morals may be taken into account. The court or jury that fixes the
punishment may then listen to the aggravating and mitigating facts, and place it where
justice and sound policy for the particular instance dictate, yet neither more nor less nor
otherwise than the law has limited and defined. But any aggravation which as a legal rule
varies the punishment must be set out in the indictment; the others need not be, though
[Vol. 22:10571066
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Even a cursory glance into the requirements for indictments
confirms that the available punishment was central to the designation
of certain crimes as misdemeanors, felonies, or treasons. 6  Prior to
the 19th century, felonies and treasons were punishable by death, while
every other offense was a misdemeanor for which a range of punish-
ment (excluding death) was available.47 These gradations in punish-
ment at common law are almost certainly the impetus behind the strict
pleading requirements which are at the heart of why elements of crimes
were thought to be so critical. Bishop, in reference to the "fundamen-
tal" notion that whatever is legally essential to the punishment must be
alleged in the indictment, explained, "If a man is charged with acts
legally punishable by imprisonment, then is hung for them, he is not
punished, he is murdered.
48
III. FINDING ELEMENTS OF CRIMES PRE-MCMILLAN
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
At common law, value and quantity determinations as they related
to applicable punishments were considered elements of the offense.49
As noted above, when the state sought to punish a defendant for felony
larceny, it was required to allege that the value of the property stolen
was sufficient to bring the felony statute into play. Otherwise, only
the available punishment for misdemeanor larceny could be inflicted.
To return to Chief Justice Rehnquist's metaphor, quantity and value
determinations (along with other traditional elements such as mens rea
and the physical characteristics which make up the act itself) historical-
ly comprised the body of the dog. These elements were required to be
pleaded in the indictment and proved to the fact finder beyond a
sometimes in practice they are.
I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 601, at 439-40 (9th ed. 1923) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
46. James Grigsby wrote, "The test as to whether an offense is a felony, in most of the
states, is whether punishment is inflicted by confinement in the penitentiary or by death." JAMES
E. GRIGSBY, GRIGSBY'S CRIMINAL LAW § 35, at 25 (1922).
47. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 1.01(A)(2) at 2 (2d ed.
1995).
48. BISHOP, supra note 45, § 80, at 47.
49. The common law requirement concerning value and quantity as it relates to the presence
of such facts in the indictment was noted by Joseph Chitty in 1816:
It is also frequently necessary in the description of an offence, to state the quantity,
number, and value of goods which are essential to the constitution of the offense, or
necessary to the right understanding of the indictment. ... In the case of theft the
value must be shown in order that it may appear whether the offence is grand or petit
larceny.
1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 235-36 (1816).
10671999]
Seattle University Law Review
reasonable doubt.5" The failure to explain adequately the essential
elements of a crime constituted reversible error. In turn, going beyond
what constitutes the crime charged in a jury instruction was also held
to be reversible error.5' In determining what constitutes a material
element, the plain meaning of the statute was usually dispositive5
s
2
These elements, in turn, had to be found by a jury; as Judge Yankwich
noted in 1946, "[t]he verdict is not merely a report upon the facts; it
is a legal decision that the facts laid before them do or do not fit the
essential elements of a social proscription, the violation of which entails
a penalty."53
On the other hand, the dog's tail included those determinations
that bore on the defendant's sentence within the statutory range.
These discretionary decisions of the trial judge were surely guided by
the judge's own conscience, values, and the constraints of the statute
itself. It is not clear from the cases by what quantum those facts
included in the tail category had to be proved."
In almost all of these cases where the quantity or value involved
in certain crimes was in dispute, the factual determination was
interpreted by the courts to be necessary to establish a required
element of the crime charged. Often the amount was the only
50. Justice Brennan wrote in Winship:
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The "demand for a
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, [though] its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems
to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the
measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the
essential elements of guilt."
Winship, 397 U.S. at 361 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-82 (1954)). See also
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
51. See United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that jury instruction
which included elements not involved in crime charged was error).
52. However, statutory language may be modified to remove legal jargon which may confuse
a jury. See United States v. Christmann, 298 F.2d 651, 653 (2d Cir. 1962).
53. Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1946) (citations omitted).
54. As Bishop noted, those facts which "aggravate an offense in morals" included a great
many things, not all of which were subject to objective proof. It can be reasonably argued that
the standard of proof in these instances was less than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
required for conviction. BISHOP, supra note 45, §§ 601-06, at 439-43. See Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949). However, the due process implications of burdens of proof within the
judge's discretionary sentencing limits are beyond the scope of this article. For a modern call for
at least clear and convincing proof when the Sentencing Guidelines are used to increase available
punishment over 300%, even though such punishment was authorized by the statute, see United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990).
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distinguishable element that separated a felony from a misdemeanor or
otherwise established culpability for a different grade of the offense."5
A. Quantity Determinations
Prohibition era decisions provide insight into how federal courts
treated value or quantity determinations when they affected the
available statutory punishment. In United States v. Setaro, the
defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained by two prohibition
agents after they raided his grocery store in search of contraband
liquor.5 6 Because the search could be upheld only if the agents had
reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been committed by the
defendant, the court first had to determine whether a violation of the
Jones Act 7 was a misdemeanor or felony. The Act, as it appeared in
1929, however, provided little guidance.
The Jones Act had originally not required proof that any
particular amount of liquor had been sold or transported in order to
impose distinct levels of punishment.5 " A first offense could be
punished by up to a thousand-dollar fine or zero to six months in jail.
A second or subsequent offense could be punished by a fine of not less
than $200 nor more than $2,000, as well as a jail term ranging from
one month to five years. Congress had also included in the Act (as it
appeared in 1929) a proviso that district courts should, " . . . in
imposing sentence hereunder, ... discriminate between casual or slight
violations and habitual sales of intoxicating liquor, or attempts to
commercialize violations of the law."' 9
55. Importantly, this continued to be the case even after the states adopted indeterminate
sentencing, in which judicial discretion to impose a sentence within a statutory range was virtually
unlimited. That discretion was thought to apply only to nonstatutory facts, such as the
defendant's potential for rehabilitation, his need for incapacitation, and the possible deterrent
effect of his punishment on others. State courts continued to require prosecutors to plead in the
indictment and prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt those statutorily articulated facts. There
was at the time no notion that statutorily enunciated facts had now become "sentencing factors"
which could avoid the rigors of constitutional proof.
56. 37 F.2d 134, 135 (D. Conn. 1930).
57. 27 U.S.C. §§ 91, 92 (1929).
58. In Pontiff v. United States, 9 F.2d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 1925), the First Circuit specifically
rejected the notion that the Jones Act (prior to 1931) required an allegation of quantity.
59. 27 U.S.C. §§ 91, 92 (1929). Discussing the impact of this proviso Judge Alschuler of
the Seventh Circuit wrote:
[Tihe proviso is an expression of legislative intent that in applying the act judges fixing
penalties within the prescribed limit "should discriminate between casual or slight
violations" and violations of a graver nature. From the wording of the proviso it seems
plain that the function of the District Court in imposing penalties under the prohibition
law was in no wise changed or restricted from what it was before the Jones Act was
passed, and that the proviso did not assume to qualify or limit the judicial discretion
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This proviso complicated matters for the Setaro court because, in
1929, Congress had also passed a separate law, which provided that
certain offenses (including acts prohibited under the Jones Act) could
be punished by up to five years in prison.6 ° This created a conflict
between the plain language of the statute and the traditional doctrine
that recognized that all punishments over a year were reserved for
felonies while punishment for less than one year was imposed for
misdemeanors. In fact, felonies under the United States Code included
any crime which could be punished by more than a year in prison.6
Holding that a "casual" or "slight" offense was a misdemeanor (and
therefore the search was illegal) the Setaro court stated:
I think it may be taken for granted that when Congress passes an
act . . . that everything after the enacting clause carries with it a
mandate. A declaration of congressional intent is a pronouncement
of the law. Statutes are not expressions of academic formulae.
They are fiats of the legislative authority or they have no place in
the books. If this is so, then the language of this proviso is binding
upon the courts, and a court would exceed its power in imposing a
five-year sentence on the occasion of a casual or slight violation of
the act.6
2
Although the Jones Act was later amended to include a quantity
requirement, prior to that amendment, courts gradated punishments
under the Act based upon whether the offender was a recidivist. In
those cases it was held that the recidivist "elements" statute had to be
pled in the indictment and proved to the jury. As Judge Inch of the
Eastern District of New York wrote in 1924:
[I]t is my opinion that before a defendant can be punished, as a
second or other offender, he must either first be convicted under, or
which District Courts always possessed respecting the imposition of penalties upon
convictions for criminal offenses.
The judge who, having power and discretion to fix the penalty within the
prescribed statutory limits, would not in all circumstances discriminate between casual
or slight violations and those which are more serious, would be unworthy of his high
office. The only rational purpose in prescribing maximum and minimum penalties is
to enable just such discrimination to be made, and, so far as human judgment can effect
it, to fit the punishment to the particular offense. The precise purpose of the proviso
is not readily understandable except as a legislative admonition to the courts, in applying
the prescribed penalties, to be just, and to proportion them to the degree of the
offending.
Foster v. United States, 47 F.2d 892, 892-93 (7th Cir. 1931).
60. 27 U.S.C. §§ 91, 92 (1929).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 541 (1929).
62. Setaro, 37 F.2d at 136.
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plead guilty to, an indictment or information, which plainly charges
him as such second or other offender, and that such indictment or
information should set out plainly such charge with the facts of his
convictions of said offenses, and it would seem to me proper that his
sentence thereon should also be set out, for prior convictions,
without sentence, give no authority to impose sentence as a second
offender.63
Amended on January 15, 1931,64 the proviso in the original Act
was replaced with a punishment scheme which imposed a maximum
penalty of six months for a first offense involving less than one
gallon.6" The Jones Act as amended in 1931 read as follows:
Provided, that any person who violates the provisions of the
National Prohibition Act, as amended and supplemented, in any of
the following ways: (1) by a sale of not more than one gallon of
liquor as that word is defined by section 1 of Title II of said Act:
Provided, however, That the defendant has not theretofore within
two years been convicted of a violation of the said Act, or is not
63. United States ex rel. Manchbach v. Moore, 2 F.2d 988, 990 (E.D. N.Y. 1924) (citing
United States v. Lindquist, 285 F. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1921)). See also Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1931) which held:
[T]he Jones Act created no new crime. It increased the penalties for "illegal
manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, or exportation," as defined by § 1, title
II of the National Prohibition Act, to a fine not exceeding $10,000, or imprisonment not
exceeding five years, or both, and added as a proviso, "that it is the intent of Congress
that the court, in imposing sentence hereunder, should discriminate between casual or
slight violations and habitual sales of intoxicating liquor, or attempts to commercialize
violations of the law." As the Act added no new criminal offense to those enumerated
and defined in the National Prohibition Act, it added nothing to the material allegations
required to be set out in indictments for those offenses. The proviso is only a guide to
the discretion of the court in imposing the increased sentences for those offenses for
which an increased penalty is authorized by the Act.
Moore demonstrates the tenacity with which courts adhered to the view that recidivism-and
other punishment enhancers-must be proved at trial. The defendant admitted at sentencing that
he had been convicted on several prior occasions for precisely the same kind of violations, and the
court found that if ever there was a person deserving of harsh treatment, it was the defendant.
Nevertheless, because the government had not pleaded and proved the recidivism, the court
treated the defendant as though he were a first offender.
64. 46 Stat. 1036 (1931). Prior to its amendment in 1931, the Act provided that the penalty
would be enhanced for recidivists. Nevertheless, this was not a "sentencing factor." The Act
expressly provided that "It shall be the duty of the prosecuting officer to ascertain whether the
defendant has been previously convicted and to plead the prior conviction in the affidavit,
information, or indictment." 27 U.S.C. § 46 (1919).
65. The Act, as amended, was structured in much the same way as 21 U.S.C. § 841
(possession with intent to distribute controlled substances) is today. Prohibited acts (i.e.,
manufacturing or transportation of intoxicating liquors) were followed by a detailed penalties
section. 27 U.S.C. § 46 (1926) ("Punishment for unlawful manufacture or sale of liquor .
repealed ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
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engaged in habitual violation of same; (2) by unlawful making of
liquor. . . exceeding one gallon... (4) by unlawfully transporting
not exceeding one gallon of liquor . . . shall for each offense be
subject to a fine of not to exceed $500 or to be confined in jail,
without hard labor, not to exceed six months, or both.66
If the sale involved more than a gallon, the defendant faced a
potential five years in prison. 7 In Pace v. Aderhold,6" the defendant
William Pace brought a habeas corpus petition alleging that the
indictment, which charged him with unlawfully selling intoxicating
liquor in violation of the Jones Act, was insufficient in that it did not
allege the quantity sold.
Under the amended Jones Act, if the sale involved less than a
gallon, Pace's sentence could not exceed six months in jail. If more
than a gallon was involved, Pace would then face a sentence between
one month and five years. Because Pace was not charged as a repeat
offender under the Act, the only critical factual determination to be
made that would impact his sentence was the amount of liquor
involved.
The district court granted Pace's petition and noted:
[T]he indictment must allege, as essential elements of the offense, the
fact that more than one gallon of liquor is involved or that the
defendant has been convicted within two years of violation of the act
or was engaged in habitual violation of same. If such allegation is
not made, the indictment will be held to allege the lesser offense
only, and any sentence providing for imprisonment in a penitentiary
or in a jail beyond the maximum term provided by the amendment
would be void.69
The court continued:
It is necessary that the allegations bring the accused clearly within
the intent of the statute prescribing the additional punishment. In
this respect the charge must be definite and certain. So, if such is a
statutory element, it must appear that the offense was committed
after a prior conviction, and where the statute provides that the
additional punishment shall be imposed where defendant has before
been sentenced, it is necessary to allege the sentence, but not merely
that the accused has been convicted. 70
66. 27 U.S.C. § 46, 46 Stat. 1036 (January 15, 1931).
67. Id.
68. 2 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Georgia 1932).
69. Id. at 263 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals affirmed and wrote:
[S]ince the adoption of that amendment, the quantity alleged to have
been sold becomes of vital importance to the defendant .... The
indictment ought therefore to allege whether the sale was of a gallon
or less, or of more than a gallon. Without such an allegation, the
trial court has no guide for determining the maximum punishment
which he is authorized by law to impose ... Any aggravation of an
offense for which the law authorizes an increase in punishment must be
stated in the indictment.7
Without a quantity allegation, there was no meaningful way of
deciding whether Pace should receive a maximum sentence of six
months or one of five years. The quantity involved was therefore a
critical part of the metaphorical "dog" because it constituted one of the
essential elements of the offense. The distinction between a casual and
a slight offense, and subsequently a conviction for either a felony or a
misdemeanor, turned on this factual determination.
Using Pace as a guide, the court in Olivito v. United States72
wrote:
The logic of this decision compels the conclusion that where the
aggravation relied upon consists in some circumstances other than
handling liquor in greater quantities than one gallon, such as prior
conviction within two years, or habitual violation, that fact must be
alleged and proved before the aggravated penalty can be invoked.73
The Prohibition cases thus stand for the general proposition that
any statutorily enunciated factor which is linked to increased punish-
ment must be pleaded and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
This lesson alone would be significant. But perhaps even more
significant, in light of recent developments, 74 is the fact that the
structure of the Jones Act was virtually identical to the structure of the
current drug statutes: substantive offenses were first enunciated in
preliminary sections of the statute, followed by a section denominated
"Penalties." In that section were the pivotal clauses involved in the
1931 Amendment, which differentiated punishment on the basis of the
amount of liquor involved.75 Nevertheless, the courts had no difficul-
71. Aderhold, 65 F.2d at 790-91 (citing BISHOP'S CR. LAW § 601) (emphasis added).
72. 67 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1933).
73. Id. at 565. See also United States v. Noel, 51 F.2d 139, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
74. See infra Section V.
75. See 46 Stat. 1036 (1931).
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ty in finding that the amount of liquor was an element of the crime
and that the state had to prove the amount beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Value Determinations
Cases where the value of goods or property involved in a crime is
at issue provide additional insight into how federal courts have
determined whether particular facts are elements of the crime. Even
though the value involved in these cases went only to the availability
of a certain punishment, they were nonetheless still considered part of
the essential element "dog" rather than the sentencing factor "tail."
In Henry v. United States, 6 the defendant appealed his convic-
tion on two counts of embezzling from a stock brokerage firm in which
he was a partner. The applicable statute was divided into what could
be termed the "substantive" elements and the "penalty" elements. The
substantive elements were found in section 834 of the D.C. Code,
which stated in part:
If any [person] of any association or incorporated company, shall
wrongfully convert to his own use... anything of value which shall
come into his possession or under his care .. .he shall be deemed
guilty of embezzlement, and shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more
than ten years, or both.77
The degrees of the offense were set out later in Section 851(a):
Whoever shall be guilty of any offense defined in sections eight
hundred and thirty four.., shall, where the thing, evidence of debt,
property, proceeds or profits be of the value of not more than thirty-
five dollars, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one
year or a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or both.7"
Even though the evidence before the jury at most implied some
indefinite value for the stock, the trial court refused to allow the issue
of the stock's actual value to go to the jury by instructing them that
the statute only required a finding of "any value" and that, as a matter
of law, the stock had value because money was lent on its value.79
The court of appeals reversed and wrote:
The value of the property converted is a material element of the offense
charged, and it must not only be alleged, but like all other statutory
76. 263 F. 459 (D.C. Cir. 1919).
77. D.C. Code Ann. § 834 (1919).
78. D.C. Code Ann. § 851(a) (1919).
79. Henry, 263 F. at 461.
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elements defining the crime, it must be proved by competent evidence to
the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases of this
sort, the jury should be instructed to find definitely the value of the
property alleged to have been embezzled, or at least, that it had a
value of over $35. In the present case, the court by the above
instruction,80 withdrew from the consideration of the jury the issue
of the actual or market value of the stock. . . . A verdict was
rendered, finding defendant guilty as charged in the indictment....
This finding not only is not supported by the evidence, but it is
contrary to the instructions of the court and the whole theory upon
which the case was tried and submitted to the jury. In other words
the verdict fails to respond to the case submitted to the jury and the
case considered by it."
The Henry opinion is instructive both in terms of what it says and
what it does not. The court emphatically stated that elements of the
crime are to be pleaded in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. The court also noted that the value determination
is an element of the offense, even though the provisions establishing
degrees of punishment appear several sections apart from the "act"
section of the D.C. Code. The court found that a conviction under
§ 834 was not possible without an allegation and proof of value, even
though the section clearly states that converting to personal use
"anything of value" constitutes embezzlement. While it certainly was
possible to read the two sections as constituting separate crimes, the
court declined to do so and instead chose to combine the value
involved with the available punishment to find an "element" of the
offense. 2
A mere allegation of value within the indictment is also insuffi-
cient-the courts consistently held that value had to be proved at trial.
For example, in United States v. Wilson13 the defendant was convicted
80. The trial court's instruction read:
It is not necessary that the government should prove the market value of the stock....
The statute under which the indictment was found is satisfied if it had any value at the
time it was hypothecated, and the fact that the money was borrowed on the security of
this stock, if it was, is evidence of value.
Id. at 461.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. Currently, drug possession prosecutions under § 841(a) and (b) make the distinction
between a "penalty" section and a "substantive" section. The reported cases hold that facts to
be found under the "penalty" provisions are not "elements" of the crime. See infra note 179. For
now, it is enough to note that courts prior to McMillan did not draw a distinction between a
"penalty" section and a "substantive" section as it affects whether a particular fact was an element
of the crime.
83. 284 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1960).
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of stealing seventy-two rifles that belonged to the United States. The
statute read:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his
use or the use of another ... any record, voucher, money, or thing
of value of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the
value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both. 4
Although the indictment alleged that the stolen rifles were worth
$7,500.00, the government offered no proof at trial as to the actual
value of the rifles. Reversing the trial court's imposition of a sentence
of seven and a half years, the court reasoned that it was essentially
being asked to:
take judicial notice that 72 rifles are worth more than $100.00, but
we cannot on the basis of anything in the testimony form a
judgment as to the value for the purpose of supporting the greater
penalty. Nor, in the absence of any proof of value, could the jury
be permitted to speculate on this point merely from the appearance
of the articles. A fact which distinguishes a violation punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year from a violation punishable by
imprisonment for ten years cannot be permitted to rest upon conjecture
or surmise. In order to sustain the imposition of the higher penalty,
it was as incumbent upon the government to prove a value in excess
of $100.00 as it was to prove the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime, or the ownership of the property.8"
The court thus declared that placing value in the indictment alone
was insufficient and that the government had to prove this value
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Mere notice to the defendant that
he faced a potentially higher sentence-if convicted-was not the only
point of the requirement. The other critical point was that fairness to
the defendant required that these facts be proved to a jury by the
highest burden. Whether this stance was termed "due process" or was
simply an implementation of a rule of statutory interpretation was
essentially irrelevant-it articulated a position of fairness to the
defendant which the court took for granted.
Although Wilson's challenge to his sentence was based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence, the Fourth Circuit would not uphold the
84. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1943).
85. Wilson, 284 F.2d at 408 (emphasis added).
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conviction absent proof of value, even though the rifles themselves
were apparently produced in evidence. This fact illustrates the
traditional view that value determinations are critical elements of a
larceny conviction and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A
critical part of the opinion centers on the court's unwillingness to let
the jury "speculate" on the value of the rifles. Even though this
factual determination was clearly within the realm of decisions to be
made by the jury, the Wilson court felt that, absent any evidence of
value, the jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the rifles
were worth more than one hundred dollars.8 6
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Stevens v. United States,7 which
cited both Wilson"8 and Cartwright,9 agreed with those cases and
explicitly held that "value is an essential element of the offense which
must be alleged and proved in the same manner as any other essential
element of the offense."90  Other courts also agreed. In Robinson v.
United States,91 the defendant was convicted of possession of dresses
stolen from an interstate shipment. The court noted that Robinson's
indictment was in the usual form (in that it contained an allegation of
value) and then proceeded to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence.
The court found that it "was manifest from the provisions [of the
statute] that the value of goods stolen from an interstate shipment is
substantive to the degree of crimes there denounced." 92
The Third Circuit came to the same conclusion in 1966 when it
decided United States v. Ciongoli 3 In Ciongoli, the defendant was
convicted of stealing fifty-one postal money orders. Since the
indictment contained an allegation of value which brought the felony
provisions into play, the only question before the court was the
sufficiency of the evidence. The court found that Ciongoli's conviction
could be sustained absent proof that the money orders were worth
more than one hundred dollars. However, even though "no particular
86. As support for the proposition that linking severity of punishment to the value of
property requires proof to ajury, the Wilson court cites Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133,
135 (5th Cir. 1944) ("It is therefore well settled that where the grade of larceny, and consequently
the punishment, depend on the value of the property, it is essential that the value ... be alleged
and proved.").
87. 297 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1961).
88. 284 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1960).
89. 146 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1944).
90. Stevens, 297 F.2d at 665. Stevens had been convicted of stealing an oscilloscope and
power supply from a government laboratory. The sole question was whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Id.
91. 333 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964).
92. Id. at 326.
93. 358 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1966).
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value of the stolen property need be alleged or proved to sustain a
conviction ... in such a case only the lesser punishment can be
imposed. It is only the gravity or degree of the offense, as measured
by the seriousness of the harm to the state, which varies with the value
of the stolen property."94 Again, even though value may not need to
be alleged or proved, any sentence must comport with the evidence.
The Fifth Circuit echoed these sentiments in Packnett v. United
States.9" Upholding the defendant's sentence despite a dearth of
proof that the stolen credit cards in his possession were worth more
than $100, the court said:
[W]here the only element of the crime is the theft or possession of
stolen property, the fact that the value of that taken is neither
alleged nor proved is immaterial. The verdict of guilty under the
indictment as written and the proof as made, while insufficient to
support conviction for a felony, indicates that the jury determined
appellant to be guilty of the lesser crime provided for by section
659, i.e., the possession of stolen article not exceeding 100 dollars in
value. 96
As the preceding cases indicate, traditional methods used by the
federal courts to find elements of crimes were relatively straightfor-
ward. If the fact in dispute was part of the statutory scheme and
directly related to the defendant's level of punishment, then it had to
be (1) alleged in the indictment, (2) proved to the jury, and (3) proved
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain the sentence imposed.
Little distinction was made between "penalty" or "sentencing"
provisions and "elements" of the crime. Indeed, under the traditional
discretionary sentencing scheme, a judge was unfettered in setting
punishment within the available statutory range. 97  Facts to which
judges looked in order to sentence defendants included (1) precrime
conduct, such as previous convictions for a crime; (2) facts connected
with the actual offense, such as the defendant's mental status, the harm
or risk caused or the cruelty involved in the crime's commission; and
(3) postoffense conduct, such as whether the defendant had made
restitution to the victim or had instead threatened a potential witness
94. Id. at 440 (citing United States v. Marpes, 198 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1952)).
95. 503 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 951.
97. Of course, these available ranges varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (and often
varied within jurisdictions themselves), resulting in what has been characterized as a "crazy quilt
of crimes and punishments." RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON
EQUALITY AND DESERT 37-8 (1979).
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into not testifying." The presence of the identifiable fact within the
text of the statute meant that the fact was indeed an element and had
to be pleaded in the indictment and proved to a jury.
These cases support the view that, prior to McMillan and the
sentencing guidelines, value was considered an element by federal
courts. Only one case-United States v. Kramer 99-- disagreed. As
Judge Henry Friendly there held, however, even if one calls value (or
some other fact) a nonelement, fundamental fairness to the defendant
may require that its determination be surrounded by the procedural
protections afforded elements.00 Kramer was convicted of conspiracy
and receiving stolen blank money orders from a series of post office
burglaries. He challenged his conviction on the grounds that the blank
orders could not have a value exceeding $100 as required by stat-
ute."' The court refused to characterize the question of value as an
element of the offense. To the contrary, the court specifically held that
the value determination went only to the degree of punishment.102
However, in a significant move, even though the court did not call
value an "element," it nonetheless found that under the Sixth
Amendment, the defendant was entitled to have the fact determined by
a jury rather than the sentencing judge. Judge Friendly declared:
[W]e assume the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have that
fact determined by the jury rather than the sentencing judge. There
is, of course, a certain incongruity in asking a jury to exercise such
expertise in the ways of the underworld as to determine the "value"
of money orders that can be or have been forged; but the omni-
science of the jury extends to harder questions than that.10 3
In emphasizing the substantive protections due the defendant and
raising Sixth Amendment jury rights over the definitional quality of
what constitutes the elements of § 641, the Kramer court granted the
defendant the exact same protections he would have been afforded by
labeling the value determination an element of the offense without
doing so.104
98. For a more in-depth discussion of these factors see SINGER, supra note 97, at 78-91.
99. 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
100. Id. at 920-21.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1943). See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102. Kramer, 289 F.2d at 920.
103. Id. at 921. Kramer's conviction had already been reversed and remanded on other
grounds, perhaps making this analysis merely dictum.
104. The Kramer decision created a technical split among the circuits since it held, contrary
to every other court, that value was not an element. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court never
reviewed this split, perhaps in part because, despite its doctrinal differences with the other courts,
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C. Concurrent Acts-Sentencing Factors or Elements
of Separate Offenses?
In another corner of pre-McMillan decisions, courts consistently
held that acts such as (1) putting in jeopardy the life of any person; (2)
causing serious bodily harm; or (3) possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, were elements of separate offenses rather than
sentencing factors which increase the available punishment for the
commission of predicate offenses."' 5 In this regard, an analysis of the
federal bank robbery statute is helpful." 6
In subsection (a), the bank robbery statute punishes by a fine or
sentence of not more than twenty years in prison (or both) any person
who, "by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes ... any
property or money ... belonging to ... any bank."'0 7 In subsection
(d) the statute increases the available maximum punishment to a term
of twenty-five years in prison should any person, while committing or
attempting to commit an offense defined in subsection (a), "assault any
person, or put[] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a
dangerous weapon or device." '
In Simpson v. United States,'°9 the Court held that a conviction
under the federal firearms statute10 merged into a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which the Court characterized numerous times as
a separate offense.1  In fact, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, adopted the interpretation of the bank robbery statute put
forth by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Beasley1 2 and expressly
adopted a reading of § 2113(d) which set the subsection apart from
§ 2113(a). 13 Other pre-McMillan courts followed the same reason-
ing. 1
14
the Second Circuit provided the same protections that the other courts had. In short, while there
was a doctrinal split, there was no split as to the practical impact.
105. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 109-14.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)-(h) (1996).
107. Id. at § 2113(a).
108. Id. at § 2113(d).
109. 435 U.S. 6 (1978). While Simpson was based upon the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
analog is clear.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970).
111. Simpson, 435 U.S. at 7, 10.
112. 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1971).
113. Judge McCree, in a concurring opinion, wrote, "[The language of § 2113(d)] clearly
requires the commission of something more than the elements of the offense described in
§ 2113(a)." Id. at 1283.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 675 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Thus, pre-McMillan the rule was clear, and so well understood
that it was rarely articulated-facts going to punishment were elements
of the crime.
IV. THE MCMILLAN LEGACY-IGNORING THE PAST AND
RESTRUCTURING THE FUTURE
A. McMillan-"Sentencing Factors" and Relaxed Due Process
In Winship,"' the Supreme Court held that "[T]he Due Process
clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.""' 6  While this command established the
burden of proof for those facts which constitute the crime, it did little
to help courts define exactly what those facts were since this precise
issue was not raised in the case. In an attempt to clarify what
constituted an element of the crime, as well as limit the potential reach
of the Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 17 Patterson v. New
York 1.8 held that even though a fact may affect the degree of criminal
liability, it does not follow that the state must prove the fact beyond
a reasonable doubt if that factor was not historically viewed as an
element of the crime, but instead had only gone to sentencing."'
Patterson opened the door for creative legislatures to evade the
fundamental protections afforded in Winship by carefully drafting their
statutes. 2 ° As Professor Dressler explains, "[t]he practical effect of
Patterson is to permit legislatures, at least under the aegis of the due
process clause, to avoid the restrictions of Winship by redrafting their
statutes to treat the absence of what had previously been an element of
115. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship did not attempt to define what constitutes those "facts
necessary" or "elements" of the crime. Instead, the decision served as a forceful restatement of
the burden of proof in criminal cases.
116. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). While the Court's actual holding is restricted to the first
part of the sentence-requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal proceedings-it
is the second half of the sentence which has become the more important aspect of that decision.
117. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Mullaney held that, under Maine's statute as interpreted and
applied by the trial court, the prosecution had to prove that the defendant was not only guilty of
criminal homicide, but also had to prove every fact which went to either the degree of criminal
culpability or the sentence. Or, in other words, should the defendant raise an affirmative defense
(or meet whatever burden of going forward with the defense which was required) then the state
had to disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
118. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
119. Id. at 214-15, n. 15. While the court mentioned that there were constitutional limits
beyond which the legislature could not go, the court did not (and has not) elaborated.
120. Perhaps in its attempt to limit Mullaney, the Patterson court opened the door for the
element/factor distinction carved out in McMillan.
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the offense as an affirmative defense.' 12 ' For the next decade, lower
courts and commentators grappled primarily with the issue of what
facts constituted affirmative defenses rather than what constituted
sentencing factors.
The watershed decision on the issue of elements of crimes came
in McMillan.12   In McMillan, the Court upheld a five-year manda-
tory minimum sentence for visibly possessing a weapon during the
commission of certain enumerated offenses. The Pennsylvania statute
specifically stated that weapon possession was not to be considered an
element of the crime' In upholding the Pennsylvania statute,
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Patterson and noted, "Patterson
stressed that in determining what facts must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the
offense is usually dispositive.
124
Expanding this thought, Rehnquist wrote:
While visible possession might well have been included as an
element of the enumerated offenses, Pennsylvania chose not to
redefine those offenses in order to so include it, and Patterson
teaches that we should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the
State from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes
and prescribing penalties. 2 '
The definition of an "element" of the crime thus became wholly
tautological. An element is whatever the legislature says it is; indeed,
so long as the legislature says that a fact is not an element almost all
121. DRESSLER, supra note 47, § 7.03(B)(3)(b), at 58.
122. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Even though McMillan is cited more for the proposition that a
preponderance of the evidence satisfies due process at sentencing, it is the Court's utilization of
element versus sentencing factor analysis which has had the most profound impact.
123. Id. at 82.
124. Id. at 85 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).
125. Id. at 86. The contention that Patterson overruled Mullaney, or in any significant way
limited it, is simply wrong. In Patterson, the legislature, by allowing.a reduction of liability if the
killing occurred during "extreme emotional or mental disturbance," was seeking to help the
defendant by providing an affirmative defense not acknowledged by the common law, whereas
the state in Mullaney was attempting to aggravate the defendant's situation. See Herman, supra
note 19, at 326. Under common law, a defendant killing in extreme emotional disturbance, but
not in the heat of passion, was guilty of murder. New York's statute benefited such a defendant
by reducing his crime to manslaughter. Thus, the statutory scheme in Patterson aided the
defendant. The actual holding of Patterson, then, can only be understood in the context of a
beneficent state statute. Patterson's language, that "the Constitution requires scarcely any
sentencing factors to be treated as elements," must be read in the context of sentencing factors
which ameliorate a sentence. Thus, only McMillan, and not Patterson, stands as a decision which
arguably supports the view that no constitutional provision prohibits reducing the burden on the
prosecution even when a defendant's potential loss of liberty is exponentially increased.
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(but not quite all) judicial inquiry stops.'2 6 Professor Herman, in her
discussion of McMillan as it relates to the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, notes with some cynicism the political realities behind the
decision of the Pennsylvania legislature:
[T]he Pennsylvania legislature apparently was as reluctant to revisit
its criminal code as Congress was to revisit substantive criminal law
when it created the Sentencing Commission. Alternatively, the
legislature might have made visible possession of a weapon during
the commission of a felony a separate offense with its own cumula-
tive mandatory penalty. The legislature's decision to make this a
sentencing factor rather than a separate offense or an element of the
predicate offenses looks like the result of political expediency (not
wanting to reopen issues related to the underlying criminal statutes)
combined with a desire to avoid the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is difficult to imagine any other reason why the
legislature would have insisted on making such possession relevant
only at sentencing.17
While Chief Justice Rehnquist was not willing to grant complete
deference to the legislature, he did lay out considerations to look to in
determining whether the legislature had, in the guise of a sentencing
fact, truly attempted to evade Winship. Because a legislature may not
discard the presumption of innocence, the sentencing fact may not
"alter the maximum penalty for the crime committed,"' 2 8 or create
126. Some judges had great difficulty with this concept and attempted in vain to reconcile
this new element/factor distinction with the more traditional methods. See United States v.
Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Rigsby, 943 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1991); see
also discussion infra Section IV.C.
127. Herman, supra note 19, at 324 (internal citations omitted).
128. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87. McMillan, a narrow decision narrowly written and narrowly
decided, was explicit in declaring that its holding was restricted to situations where the statutory
maximum was not increased. The court explicitly cautioned that a case involving an increase in
maximum penalty would have a "more superficial appeal." This language was hardly nonchalant.
It was only in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, that this language was altered into a mere whimsy
of the Court. Almendarez-Tores ignored the primary holding of McMillan-that the statute in
that case did nothing "to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
• , of the crime for which he is to be punished." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87. In McMillan, that
crime" was breaking and entering, or burglary, which simpliciter could be punished by up to
twenty years. In Almendarez. Torres and Jones, however, the "crime" for which defendant is being
sentenced is not "carjacking" or "being in the US after being deported," but "carjacking with
bodily harm" or "being in the US after being deported for a felony." While a defendant in
Pennsylvania could be sentenced to five years for mere burglary or mere breaking and entering,
no federal defendant could be sentenced to 20 or 25 years for mere carjacking (as in Jones) or for
merely being a deported alien in the United States (as in Almendarez-Torres). Without the added
words, the sentence would be beyond the statutory maximum. That fact alone distinguishes
McMillan from Jones. See sections IV.D and V, infra.
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